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JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this court is properly based upon the 
transfer of case no. 88-0464 by the Utah Supreme Court to this 
court under Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and 
pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(j) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the 
Defendants entered by the Honorable Frank G. Noel on June 6, 1988, 
and an Order denying Plaintiffs1 Motion for a New Trial and to 
Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence entered on October 
26, 1988. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence Under Rule 15 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure where evidence concerning the 
issues of mistake and illegality was presented and tried at trial 
without objection by the opposing party? 
2. Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to 
sustain a finding that the Defendants made a number of 
representations either negligently and/or fraudulently which 
induced the Plaintiffs to act to their detriment and thereby 
causing Plaintiffs to sustain substantial damages? 
3. Did the trial judge err in basing his decision on his 
physical inspection of the property as it appeared at the time of 
trial without foundation for the view regarding its appearance at 
the time of Plaintiffs' purchase in 1982? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs, Joseph D. Sanders and Cheryl M. Sandersf 
appeal from a judgment allowing Defendants to foreclose upon their 
Trust Deed and awarding them money damages. Plaintiffs then filed 
a Motion for a New Trial and to Amend Their Pleadings to Conform 
to the Evidence Presented at Trial. The court denied that Motion 
on October 26, 1988. Plaintiffs appeal both those Orders. 
In March of 1979, Defendants Ovard purchased two acres of 
property from Mr. Layne Newman. (Trial Transcript, (hereinafter 
"Tr.") 58, Trial Exhibits 12-D and 13-D) That transaction was 
accomplished by two trust deeds, each covering one acre. (Tr. 206) 
At approximately the same time, Mr. Ovard and Mr. Newman submitted 
a request for a variance to the City of Draper. (Tr. 61, Trial 
Exhibit 7-P) Their request was accompanied by a plat showing five 
acres divided into a three-acre lot (Mr. Newman's) and a two-acre 
lot (Mr. Ovard1s). (Tr. 61, Trial Exhibit 6-P) The City of Draper 
granted them a variance to build one home on each lot subject to 
three conditions. (Tr. 61, 64, Trial Exhibit 8-P) Mr. Ovard then 
constructed his home on the two-acre parcel. 
In July of 1982, the Sanders purchased the home built by 
Martin Ovard in Draper, Utah. (Tr. 151) Soon after occupying that 
home, they became aware of some activity on the unimproved acre 
directly to the north of their property which indicated that the 
land might be sold and built upon. (Tr. 152) Plaintiffs feared 
that construction on that adjoining acre would diminish their 
enjoyment of their property. (Tr. 153) Therefore, Plaintiffs 
decided to make inquiries into purchasing the property for 
themselves. 
Joseph Sanders contacted Fred Hale, the realtor who had 
sold them their residence. (Tr. 153) He explained that he and his 
wife might be interested in buying the adjoining property in order 
to prevent someone else from building upon it. (Tr. 155) They 
examined the listing agreement and a plat map which had been 
supplied by the Defendants' realtor and agreed to make an offer on 
the property owned by the Ovards. (Tr. 153) The amount of their 
offer was based in part upon the asking price for other parcels of 
the same approximate size which could be built upon. (Tr. 156, 
157) Plaintiff paid $26,000.00 for the land. (R. 201, Trial 
Exhibits 1-P, 2-P and 3-P) 
Subsequent to this time, Plaintiffs inadvertently learned 
that the unimproved north parcel was to be sold in a tax sale. 
(Tr. 159) Further investigation led Mr. Sanders to the discovery 
that the parcel he had purchased from the Defendants and the 
parcel upon which his residence was situated, had been split by 
the Defendants. (Tr. 17) Mr. Sanders further learned that both 
parcels were subject to a variance which imposed certain 
conditions upon the land and that the City of Draper would not 
issue a building permit for the unimproved property. (Tr. 168) 
Plaintiffs approached Defendants in the hopes of resolving 
this matter informally and offered to reduce the purchase price to 
an amount which approximated the property's true value as an 
unimprovable lot. (Tr. 171) Negotiations broke down and when 
Plaintiffs refused to make any further payments on the property, 
Defendants initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding. (Tr. 
171) 
Plaintiffs filed this fraud action in the Third Judicial 
District Court and the matter was tried before the Honorable Frank 
G. Noel on October 26 and 27, 1987. At the conclusion of those 
proceedings, Plaintiff moved to amend the pleadings to conform to 
the evidence. Judge Noel took the matter under advisement until 
he had an opportunity to physically inspect the property. (R. 142) 
The court issued a memorandum opinion on December 4, 1987, 
finding in favor of the Defendants on their counter-claim and 
finding no cause of action on Plaintiffs' complaint. (R. 142-143) 
The court's decision sets forth certain observations about the 
property which were not consistent with the appearance of the 
property when purchased by the Plaintiffs in 1982. (R. 142-143) 
Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for a New Trial and to 
Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence (R. 222) The trial 
court denied both of those Motions and Plaintiffs now appeal 
seeking a new trial. (R. 255) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
mandates that pleadings be amended to conform to evidence which is 
heard without objection at trial. Evidence was presented at trial 
on the issues of illegality and mistake and Defendants impliedly 
consented to the introduction of those issues. Therefore, Judge 
Noel erred in denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Pleadings. 
II. The evidence presented at trial is sufficient to 
sustain a finding of common law fraud and/or negligent 
misrepresentation on the part of the Defendants. Plaintiffs1 
reliance on those representations was reasonable and they were 
subsequently damaged as a direct result of their reliance in 
purchasing the property in question from the Defendants. 
III. While it is proper for a trier of fact to view real 
property to clarify testimony at trial/ it is improper for a trial 
judge to view premises for the purpose of determining facts not in 
evidence. Further, the power to view should be exercised with 
extreme caution where there is a likelihood that the condition of 
the property has changed with the passage of time. The judge 
relied upon his view of the property in finding that Plaintiffs 
did not exercise due diligence in investigating the property they 
were purchasing in 1982; this constitutes a reversible error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RULE 15(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
MANDATES THAT PLEADINGS BE AMENDED TO CONFORM TO 
EVIDENCE WHICH IS ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION. 
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (attached 
as Addendum A) addresses the amendment of pleadings to conform to 
the evidence. It reads in relevant part: 
(1) When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they 
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings 
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion 
of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure 
so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of 
these issues. 
a. Illegality* 
In the trial of this matter the issues of illegality and 
mistake were raised and proved by Plaintiffs' counsel and tried 
with the implied consent of the Defendants. 
There was evidence introduced at trial by Plaintiffs' 
trial counsel regarding the illegal division of Ovardfs property 
into two one-acre parcels. The variance he received from the City 
of Draper, which allowed him to build on his land, was for one 
house on a two-acre parcel. (Tr. 61, Trial Exhibit 6-P) Thomas L. 
Spencer, the development director for the City of Draper, 
testified that the split of the two acres by Ovard, which occurred 
subsequent to the incorporation of the City of Draper, was subject 
to all the land use regulations for the city. (Tr. 17) 
Q: And in researching the files (on the subject property), 
what did you determine needed to be done to obtain a 
building permit? 
A: It appeared from the information in the files that the 
property in question had been a second split of the 
property, of the original property, from the time the city 
had incorporated, and would have to meet all the 
subdivision regulations. 
Q: Why is that significant? What are the subdivision 
regulations here? 
A: It entails a whole section on our land use regulations. 
Q: Could you direct me to access; what would be required? 
Perhaps you could just summarize those and tell me what 
would be required regarding access to comply with the 
subdivision requirement. 
A: Generally speaking, access has to be by a dedicated street 
of a minimum right away (sic) width of 50 feet. 
Mr. Spencer then testified that the subdivision regulations were 
in effect in November of 1982. (Tr. 19) 
Q: Could a building permit have been issued on the lot of Mr. 
Sanders in November of 1982? 
A: Yes, had they met all the subdivision regulations. 
Q: Including access? 
A: Including access. 
In his cross-examination of Mr. Spencer, Defendants1 
counsel raised the possibility of a variance which might allow 
development on the north acre. (Tr. 23) 
Q: Under the ordinances that were in effect in November of 
198 2, it would not be a given that you could not get a 
variance for a building on a lot that was not adjacent to 
a dedicated street; isn't that right? 
A: Under the current land use regulations the process first 
would be determined whether he had to meet the subdivision 
requirements or not. That would be determined by probably 
the Planning Commission and the City Counsel, (sic) If it 
was determined that they do not have to be processed as a 
subdivision, then they would still have to receive a 
conditional use permit from the Planning Commission and 
probably a variance from the Board of Adjustments. 
While it is true that the minimum right of way regulation can be 
circumvented with a variance, Mr. Ovard did not apply for another 
variance showing a division of the two acres before he sold the 
one-acre parcel to Mr. Sanders. 
Utah state law is quite clear about the legality of the 
division and sale of the Ovard property. §57-5-3 Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended) (attached as Addendum B) sets forth in detail 
the procedure for legally subdividing property. That statute 
requires that, "if the land is situated in any city or 
incorporated town such plat or map shall be approved by its 
governing body, or by some city or town officer for that purpose 
designated by resolution or ordinance of such governing body; . . 
.
 H
 Mr. Ovard's division of his two acres into two one-acre 
parcels did not comply with this requirement. That chapter of the 
Utah Code continues in §57-5-5 (attached as Addendum B) which 
reads: 
If any person shall sell any lot so platted according 
to such plat before it is made out, acknowledged, filed 
and recorded as aforesaid, such person whall be guilty of 
a misdemeanor for each lot which he shall sell. 
Mr. Ovard never acknowledged, filed and recorded his division of 
the two acres. Therefore he clearly violated this statute, as 
well as a number of the Draper City ordinances relating to the 
proper subdivision of real property, when he sold the vacant north 
acre to Mr. Sanders. This evidence of illegality supports a 
finding in favor of the Plaintiffs. This point was argued by 
Plaintiffs' counsel during and subsequent to the trial and 
Defendants never raised any objection. (Tr. 175f 178, 179; R. 
227-228) 
The elements of both unilateral and mutual mistake are 
supported by the evidence presented at trial and it was an error 
for the court not to allow the Plaintiffs to amend their pleadings 
to conform to that evidence. 
b. Mistake. 
Mr. Sanders believed that the lot he purchased from the 
Ovards was a lot which could be developed. (Tr. 157) This belief 
was reasonable in light of the facts established at trial. For 
example, a realtor and some potential buyers had staked out the 
outline of a home on the vacant acre next to Mr. Sanders' home. 
(Tr. 152, 153) The purchase price of the parcel was comparable to 
similarly sized lots which were developable in that area, the plat 
map shown to Mr. Sanders by the realtor indicated an access road 
passing through the lot where his home was located to the vacant 
back lot and there were homes being constructed on apparent lots 
on either side of his home. (Tr. 156-158) In other words, it 
appeared to be a legal subdivision. 
The first part of Rule 15(b) has been interpreted as a 
mandatory requirement that the trial court grant leave to amend 
pleadings to conform to the evidence to include issues tried by 
the express or implied consent of the parties. Lloyd's Unlimited 
v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah App. 
1988); Poulsen v. Poulsen, 672 P.2d 97, 99 (Utah 1983). This 
court most recently addressed the interpretation of Rule 15(b) in 
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987). In that case the 
court addressed the question of "implied consent" and found that 
it would exist "where one party raises an issue material to the 
other party's case or where evidence is introduced without 
objection, where it appears 'that the parties understood the 
evidence to be aimed at the unpleaded issues.'M I_d_. at 785. The 
court went on to state that the test for deciding whether 
pleadings should be deemed amended under Rule 15(b) is "whether 
the opposing party had a fair opportunity to defend and whether it 
could offer additional evidence if the case were retried on a 
different theory." Id. 
In the present case, the elements of illegality and 
mistake were supported by uncontested evidence. The Defendants 
had ample opportunity to introduce evidence supporting the 
legality of Mr. Ovard's actions in dividing up his two-acre 
parcel. In addition, Plaintiffs initially made a verbal Motion to 
Amend at the conclusion of their case. (Tr. 200) At that time, 
Defendants were put on notice of Plaintiffs' intent to argue that 
there were issues of mistake involved in that matter. Defendants 
had the opportunity to rebut and defend the issue of mistake in 
presenting their case to the court. 
In this case, as in Colman v. Colman, there is no 
indication in the record that the Defendants were surprised or 
otherwise disadvantaged in addressing the issues of mistake and 
illegality. Under the first part of Rule 15(b)/ it is mandatory 
that the trial court grant leave to amend pleadings to conform to 
the evidence to include issues tried by the express or implied 
consent of the parties. Poulsen, 672 P.2d 97, 99; Lloyd's 
Unlimited/ 753 P.2d 507, 509. The judge's failure to grant 
Plaintiffs' Motion is adequate basis for reversing his decision 
and granting Plaintiffs a new trial. 
II. THE FACTS SUPPORT A FINDING OF FRAUD AND 
MISREPRESENTATION. 
The elements of common law fraud in Utah are set forth in 
the case of Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952), Those 
elements are: 
1. a representation made concerning a presently 
existing material fact which was false; 
2. the representor either knew it to be false or 
made it recklessly knowing he had insufficient knowledge 
upon which to base such representation; 
3. the representation was made for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it and that the other 
party acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity 
did so, in fact, rely upon it; 
4. the party induced to act is injured and damaged. 
Id. at 274, 275. These elements have been interpreted and applied 
in subsequent cases, the most relevant one being Dugan v. Jones, 
615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) . 
In Dugan, a parcel of land had been listed as comprising 
22-3/4 acres. Apparently, less than half that amount was usable 
land because some acres lay beneath a river bed. The trial court 
found the vendor not liable for fraud apparently because it was 
unconvinced the vendor had knowledge of the falsity of his 
representation. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, explaining: 
[i]n a case where the circumstances impose upon the 
vendor a special duty to know the truth of his 
representations or where the nature of the situation is 
such the vendor is presumed to know the facts to which his 
representation relates, a misrepresentation is fraudulent 
even though not made knowingly, willfully or with actual 
intent to deceive. . • . 
'The reason, of course, is that the parties to a real 
estate transaction do not deal on equal terms. An owner 
is presumed to know the boundaries of his own land, the 
quantity of his acreage, and the amount of water 
available. If he does not know the correct information, 
he must find out or refrain from making representations to 
unsuspecting strangers. Even honesty in making a mistake 
is no defense as it is incumbent upon the vendor to know 
the facts.• 
Dugan v. Jones at 1246. Even though the misrepresentation of 
acreage had been innocently made, the Defendants were found to 
have negligently misrepresented the facts. 
a. The Representations Made by Defendants Were Inaccurate 
and Made Fraudulently and/or Negligently. 
The Sanders contend that the judge erred in ruling that 
the statements and omissions relied upon by the Plaintiffs were 
not fraudulent nor were they made negligently. (Tr. 64) The 
record establishes that Defendant Ovard applied for a variance 
with Layne Newman to build one home on a two-acre parcel of 
property. (Tr. 64, Trial Exhibits 6-P and 7-P) (attached as 
Addenda C and D) At approximately the same time, he was 
purchasing those two acres from Layne Newman under two earnest 
money agreements. (Trial Exhibits 12-D and 13-D) (attached as 
Addenda E and F) At one time, Mr. Newman had submitted a plat 
showing five one-acre lots for approval by Draper City. (Trial 
Exhibit 15-P) (attached as Addendum G) That petition was denied 
but Mr. Newman continued to use those plat designations in 
dividing the two acres he was selling to Mr. Ovard. (Tr. 59-60) 
Mr. Ovard knew that the two-acre parcel was not legally subdivided 
and that is why his application for the variance shows just one 
two-acre lot. (Trial Exhibit 6-P) The City of Draper granted the 
Newman-Ovard variance for two homes (with the Ovard home to be 
built on two acres-not one) on April 12, 1979. (Trial Exhibit 8-P) 
(attached as Addendum H) 
Sometime later, Ovard encountered financial difficulties 
while constructing his home and deeded a portion of his interest 
in one of those artificially and illegally created "lots" to his 
father as security for a loan. (Tr. 65) He was eventually forced 
to sell the home on the southern acre and that home was 
subsequently purchased by the Sanders. 
Still encountering financial trouble, Mr. Ovard listed the 
vacant northern acre with Gerry Whipple, a real estate agent. Mr. 
Whipple testified that Sam Ovard gave him a plat resembling 
Exhibit 15-P, showing the two-acre parcel divided into two lots, 
never explaining that the two acres were not legally subdivided. 
(Tr. 81) Ovard admitted not telling Mr. Whipple about the 
variance on the property which had imposed a number of 
requirements on the two-acre parcel. (Tr. 71, 82) In addition, 
the listing agreement described the property as "down a private 
lane to tree-lined seclusion/" with access to utilities, 
deliberately giving the impression that the site would be 
developed. (Tr. 83-86, Trial Exhibit 10-P) (attached as Addendum 
I) The plat did not accurately represent the status of the 
two-acre parcel. The Ovards failed to disclose the existence of 
the variance. The representations and omissions were and/or made 
negligently with the intent of securing a buyer for that property 
at an inflated price. 
When the Ovards caused their property to be listed through 
the Mulitiple Listing Service of the Salt Lake Board of Realtors, 
the listing showed the property as zoned A-1. (Trial Exhibit 10-P) 
The meaning of the zoning designation at that time was 
agricultural with a single dwelling built on a one-acre lot. (Tr. 
83) Again, the implication raised by the listing was that the 
property was developable which was intended to secure top dollar 
for that property even though the Ovards knew that the property 
could not be built upon without the approval of the city. (Tr. 71, 
214) 
When the Sanders began to suspect that someone might 
purchase the north acre of land, they made inquiries into 
purchasing that property and relied upon the aforementioned 
representations in their decision to purchase the property for 
$26,000.00. (Tr. 156-157) Their decision was based on the theory 
that they could eventually sell that lot to a party wishing to 
build a home on it for an amount in the neighborhood of what they 
paid for it. (Tr. 156) 
b. Plaintiffs' Reliance on Defendants' Representations 
Was Reasonable. 
The judge found that the Plaintiffs failed to exercise 
"due diligence" to determine the status of the property in their 
failure to be alerted to access problems to the property. This 
conclusion is directly contrary to the evidence. 
1. The Subdivision Plat 
(Trial Exhibit 15-Pf attached as Addendum G) 
This exhibit represents the proposed subdivision 
application submitted by Layne Newman to the City of Draper which 
was subsequently denied. (T-60) That plat shows a right of way 
passing through Lot 4 to Lot 5. The right of way was visible and 
apparent when the Sanders purchased their home and when they 
subsequently purchased the north acre from the Ovards. 
2. The Listing Agreement 
(Trial Exhibit 10-P, attached as Addendum I) 
This exhibit describes the property as "down a private 
lane to tree-lined seclusion." The visual information contained 
in this exhibit indicates that there is access to the property 
along a private lane. That description was consistent with the 
appearance of the property in 1982 when Plaintiffs purchased the 
lots. In fact, the Affidavits submitted by the Defendants in 
opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial support the fact 
that the property was indeed accessible in the fall of 1982 by a 
road passing through the southern parcel. (R. 238-239, 244) Those 
same Affidavits indicate that bhe appearance of the cul-de-sac has 
changed dramatically from the fall of 1982, to the time when the 
judge viewed the cul-de-sac in 1986. A curb had been installed, 
bushes and shrubs planted and a concrete wall was erected stemming 
from the cul-de-sac. (R. 239, 240, 243) Meanwhile, the access to 
the north lot had become overgrown from nonuse which might cause 
the judge to perceive the surroundings differently from how they 
might have been reaonably perceived in 1982 by the Sanders. (R. 
244) 
3. The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
(Trial Exhibit 18-D, attached as Addendum J) 
This document clearly demonstrates that the Sanders were 
concerned with access to the north acre. Line 24 reads "Offer 
subject to 35' right of way adjacent to Sanders property and 
subject property be vacated and reverting to buyer." This 
condition is consistent with the information provided on the plat 
map which Plaintiffs relied upon in making their offer. (Trial 
Exhibit 15-P) That map shows a 35' right of way as a continuation 
of the main road past the Sanders residence to the northern 
property. 
In the present case, the Ovards knew that the property 
could not be built upon without a variance. (Tr. 71, 214) Yet 
they represented it to be a subdivided lot suitable for building 
purposes. Their representations were material to the sale of 
that property because the price paid for that acre would be much 
lower if the buyer knew that it did not comply with the Draper 
subdivision regulations and that in order to get a building permit 
they would first have to petition the Board of Adjustments for a 
variance. Any potential purchaser would also risk the possibility 
that a variance would not be granted and that the property might 
never be developed. In addition, the buyer of that acre would be 
in violation of §57-5-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) when he 
or she decided to sell that "lot." 
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Dugan concerned 
precisely the same situation presented in this case. The Ovards, 
as owners, had a duty to affirmatively reveal the facts concerning 
the variance which had been granted on the two-acre parcel and 
that the north acre was not subdivided in accordance with 
applicable state and municipal laws. The Ovards further had a 
duty to inform all prospective buyers that the lot in its present 
state could not be developed but would require a variance from the 
city before a building permit would be issued. Their failure to 
disclose such information constitutes, at a minimum, negligent 
misrepresentation under the Dugan decision. 
c. Plaintiffs Sustained Damages as a Direct Result of 
Their Reliance Upon Defendants1 Representation. 
A great deal of evidence was presented at trial 
concerning the actual value of the acre of land purchased by the 
Plaintiffs. Johnathan L. Cook, M. A. I., a real estate appraiser, 
testified that the true value of an acre of undevelopable land in 
that area was $8,000.00. Plaintiffs agreed to pay $26,000.00 for 
that property. (Tr. 28) Plaintiffs sustained actual damages in an 
amount not less than $18,000.00. 
III. THE JUDGE IMPROPERLY BASED HIS DECISION ON HIS VIEW 
OF THE PROPERTY AS IT APPEARED IN 1986. 
At the conclusion of the trial proceedings, the judge 
indicated he would view the surroundings. He took the entire 
matter under advisement pending the view. 
In the memorandum decision issued by the court, it was 
apparent that the court had relied heavily on the physical 
appearance of the property when he viewed it. The judge wrote: 
Moreover, the court feels the Plaintiffs did not exercise 
due diligence at the time of the purchase to determine the 
status of the property. The court is also of the opinion, 
after having viewed the property, that due to the location 
of the property, the location and placement of the home in 
front of the property, the road leading from the main 
paved road ending in what appears to be somewhat of a 
cal-de-sac (sic), and under the totality of the 
circumstances, a reasonable person should have been 
alerted that there may be access problems associated with 
the back parcel of property that should be investigated, 
(emphasis added) 
(R. 142-143, Findings of Fact #9 and 10) 
It has been generally held that when the judge is the 
trier of fact/ the judge may view the physical evidence under the 
same circumstances where a jury would be so allowed. 4 Wigmore, 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law (Chadbourn rev. 1972) §1169. One 
circumstance affecting the exercise of the court's discretion in 
allowing a view is whether a change of condition is likely to have 
occurred and that a view of the property in its present condition 
might be misleading. Ld. at §1164. The power of the court to 
order a view should be exercised with caution. The trial judge 
should be satisfied that conditions at the time he views the 
premises are substantially the same as they were at the time that 
the claim arose. He must also be satisfied that a personal 
inspection by him will be fair to all parties concerned and is 
reasonably necessary to do justice between them. JLd. at §1169 
(quoting from Greenberg v. Waterbury, 117 Conn. 67, 73-74, 167 
Atl. 83, 85 (1933)) . 
In the present case, it was clearly established that the 
appearance of the property in question had changed dramatically in 
the six intervening years. (R. 239, 240, 243) The Affidavits of 
neighboring residents submitted by the Defendants in opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial set forth the changes which had 
occurred around those properties since 1982. The installation of 
the curb, the planting of bushes and shrubbery and the 
construction of a concrete wall abutting the cul-de-sac are all 
examples of the dramatic changes in the appearance of those 
parcels of property. (R. 239, 240, 243) 
Cases have limited the purposes for which a view might be 
used. Vickridge First & Second Addition Homeowners Association, 
Inc. v. Catholic Diocese of Wichita, 212 Kan. 348, 510 P.2d 1296, 
1307 (1973); Groff v. Circle K Corporation, 86 N. M. 531, 525 P.2d 
891, 893 (Ct. App. 1974); Christensen v. Gensman, 333 P.2d 658 
(Wash. 1958). In Christensen, the Washington Supreme Court 
defined the proper purpose of a view by the trial judge. "The 
trial judge may view the premises for the purpose of clarifying 
and harmonizing testimony. In other words, his view of the 
premises is to aid him in his understanding of the evidence 
introduced in the case." (Citations omitted) Id_. at 662. 
However, the court went on to state that it would be improper for 
the trial judge to view the premises for the purpose of proving 
some res gestae fact not in evidence, nor may he view the premises 
for the purpose of searching for extrinsic evidence to be applied 
in corroborating or discrediting the testimony of a witness. If 
he does so, and his judgment is based thereon, it is reversible 
error. _Id. This case clearly prohibits the importance given by 
the judge to the present appearance of the properties at issue in 
this case. His finding that the Plaintiffs' reliance was not 
reasonable was based solely upon his physical impression of the 
property when he viewed it. 
More recently, the Washington Supreme Court followed 
Christensen when it reversed and remanded a decision by the trial 
court after the judge viewed the property in dispute. In 
O'Sullivan v. Scott, 25 Wash. App. 430, 607 P.2d 1246 (1980) , the 
court found that the judge relied upon his viewing of the property 
in ruling in favor of the Plaintiffs. The judge had viewed the 
property after considering opposing Affidavits which addressed the 
compliance of the Defendant with a previous court order. The 
record on appeal contained no evidence disputing the Affidavit 
submitted by the Defendant stating that he had complied with the 
court's order. 
In the present case, there is no evidence on the record 
that supports the judge's finding that there were access problems 
apparent when looking at the property as it existed in 1982. 
The judge clearly relied upon extrinsic evidence obtained in his 
view of the property in finding in favor of the Defendants. Under 
the Christensen and 0'Sullivan cases, that constitutes reversible 
error and Plaintiffs should be awarded a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs ask this court to reverse the decision of the 
trial court below and grant them a new trial on three grounds. 
First, the failure of the court to amend Plaintiffs' pleadings to 
conform to the uncontested evidence. Second, the facts clearly 
support a finding of fraud and/or negligent misrepresentation on 
the part of the Defendants. And finally, Judge Noel erred in his 
reliance upon the appearance of the property in 1986 in finding 
that the Plaintiffs did not exercise due diligence when purchasing 
the northern acre four years earlier in 1982. 
DATED this %0 day of March, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GREEN & BERRY 
jrick N> Green 
Julie V. Lund 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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ADDENDA 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his plead-
ing once as a matter of course at any time before a 
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one 
to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the 
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he 
may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is 
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading 
only by leave of court or by written consent of the 
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to 
an amended pleading within the time remaining for 
response to the original pleading or within 10 days 
after service of the amended pleading, whichever pe-
riod may be the longer, unless the court otherwise 
orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in 
the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as 
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon 
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; 
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at 
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues 
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the ad-
mission of such evidence would prejudice him in 
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. 
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to 
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the 
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence 
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of 
the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a 
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon 
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supple-
mental pleading setting forth transactions or occur-
rences or events which have happened since the date 
of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permis-
sion may be granted even though the original plead-
ing is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or 
defense. If the court deems it advisable that the ad-
verse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it 
shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
57-5-3. Maps and plats to be acknowledged, cer-
tified, approved, and recorded. 
Such map or plat shall be acknowledged by such 
owner before some officer authorized by law to take 
the acknowledgment of conveyances of real estate, 
and certified by the surveyor making such plat; if the 
land is situated in any city or incorporated town such 
plat or map shall be approved by its governing body, 
or by some city or town officer for that purpose desig-
nated by resolution or ordinance of such governing 
body; and, if the land is situated outside of any city or 
incorporated town, shall be approved by the board of 
county commissioners of the county, or by some 
county officer for that purpose designated by resolu-
tion or ordinance of such board. When so acknowl-
edged, certified and approved, it shall be filed and 
recorded in the office of the county recorder of the 
county in which the lands so platted and laid out are 
situated, except that in subdivisions of less than ten 
lots, which lots lie entirely within a city or incorpo-
rated town having a planning commission, or outside 
a city or incorporated town in a county having a 
county planning commission, land may be sold by 
metes and bounds, without necessity of recording a 
plat if all of the following conditions are met: (a) The 
subdivision layout shall have been first approved in 
writing by the planning commission, (b) the subdivi-
sion is not traversed by the mapped lines of a pro-
posed street as shown on any official map or maps, 
and does not require the dedication of any land for 
street or other public purposes, and (c) if a subdivi-
sion is located in a zoned area, each lot in the subdivi-
sion meets the frontage, width and area requirements 
of the zoning ordinance or has been granted a vari-
ance from such requirements by the board of adjust-
ment. 1»53 
57-5-5. Selling lots before recordation—Liabil-
ity—Misdemeanor. 
If any person shall still any lot so platted according 
to such plat before it is made out, acknowledged, filed 
and recorded as aforesaid, such person shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor for each lot which he shall sell. 
1953 
¥ 
l^de^dw^ 
NW'y^w 
This is to certify that this is a trueand 
accurate copy of the records on file with 
the City of Draper. 
CITY RECORDER 
7, 
^Barbara Sadler 
March 28, 1979 
To Whom it nay concern: 
M. Sam Ovard and Layne Newman are applying for a variance 
just North of 650 E. I38OO S. 
A right of way 35 feet wide and 311 feet deep connects 13800 S. 
with a 5*16 acre peice of land. 
The land is not being used for anything at the present time. 
There is nothing on the property or right of way except old shed 
foundations which will be removed and a concrete irrigation ditch 
which will stay for irrigation. The East Jordan Canal borders the 
Northern property line. 
We plan to build two homes on the property for ourselves to 
live in. 
y77 J^ &r^$ 
q^tsv^-*i rn^Sl 
If- J.- 71 
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Addterdum D 
L_ j&AJtu^cai M<JIN_Y K_U_lFT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE This may be a legally binding form, if not understood seek other advice 
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1 TO- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
N.m« of Rroher Company 
I N C O N S I D E R A T I O N O f your a^reem 
3 nerepy deposit with you a* earnest moiwv the sum <>t ( * 
4 .^^ «^m«f c n e c * 
•5 to secure and apfXv on the purchase of the oropertv situated at: _ i - ' O t ff *+ . . j - > v ^ ^  » _^-li-J _ _ V ' J- P-QXlr j;^*—$, "vT ? 6 t 
,., ; u rn reF *
 Clty i , n l t Lcke co«n,v. *.••.«. J l k i h 
< i including any of the following item* it at present attached to the premise*-. Plumbing and heating fixture* *nd equipment including stoker and on tanks, weter heaters, and burner*, electric 
light ' ixture* excluding bulb*. bathroom fixture*, toller shades, curtain rod* and fixture*, Venetian blind*, window and door screen*, l inoleum, all shrub* and trees, and any other fixture* 
,?
 . nrne 
! 4 The following personal oroperty shall also be included a* part of the property purchased: Cne sfr^ r*.- : ! Dr;.7 ?r I r r i g a t i o n water 
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*ln>n seller apnrQves sale t 
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—,". 
delivery of deed or final contract of 
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; Arc ~~.-.o c 1 'TrTT.• ; ~; . «- • •; • : ;•> .• .b j « c t tr, nuy^r r , r . . mr, r r : ' ; f r t y in A l r i n c * 
~ ^ 7h"^"ro, i rer r ^c i lT v : : ~vT: T ^ ••• ^ r'7v^.T""iT~".v,| *-•• r h ~ ~ T c t . «r , > i^ l i q r r h a l l 
• ;:>rcv7^«~^r^V^I?r^c~v-r / " ^ ' r F ^ ^ F ^ T ^"^TTTTI: ' -'; 11 ^;>- ;< p ^ . 3 -rid e l ° c t r i c 
-
 ( .-.-c.v—r.-. --•• rr»v>'f*v*, T / •. % | T".i"r w i I I " •'T7./ :. .'.• i\. If,\Y;\' ^xh?.? or d :>rovio r buy*r 
• ••''.tn ? . - ^ - : t ^ ^ r i r : t ^ ; 
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,-.«vrv«-ti»«. upon tiif iifip.uo h.n.inf r, suhirct to thf l imitation* of any mottqaoc or contract liv the otiv<-» hnrem as*unw'(1 Interest at '» per annum on the unpaid portions of the 
1 1 ' ': 3 T 7 ^ 
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Contract of $.ilc or Instrument of conveyance to be made orj the approved forrn of the UtiJh Deot. of Business Regulation in the name of 
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i in , p vi.« "t is r n i i v rd Jiul o f i n is made subiect to Ihr written acceptance of the seller endorsed hereon wtthm '_ days from date hereof, and unless so 
In ihe i-vc'i Hie pun hiser tails to p»v the h.iUii' e ol s.nrt per. h.ise price or rnuipiete said purchase as here,n p f v i r t - d , the amount, pant hereon shall, .it (he option of th» »«'ler, 
it is •m,tff.|.ni<i .md Kireed tn.it the term-, written in tins rereipi . .institute the entire Preli.nm ir-v Cnnl '""t heluv« Hie -lurchaser and the sel'nr. and fn^f no verh il it.itement made by 
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R E C E I P T 
pledge receipt of a final copy P ' the foregoing agreement bearing all signatures: \ .' 
__u 
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Purchaser Date ' 
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i.iid porrhave once or complete ',.i,n poi<-.ha*e a* heron nmvined. the amounts paid hereon shall, at the option o ' the seller. 
. rctelpf _o(i*fifu<e the ontire fVedftiinary Contract between the purchaMr and the setter, and that no verbal s'ar*m#nf m a d . by 
.orporated in wriMtiq herein. M is further a<»re«d that ex.cui in 
>pp" 
.1 MV< 
, - t » . l . 
I I , 
'tan 
M l " 
•i.X* 
IS ( . V U H f M l l< 
.1 f i e retii-M 
In t * i ' . - vn l 
neil is iKiuirl. 
It IS i.tid-rsf. 
»• this I.1.0 es 
1 received and otter is m.ide stihtect to tr 
ot thv money herein reccioti it shall < , i " 
1 'he purchaser fails to pay the t>al.im.c 
u r n and ai.rnwct dam^.ws 
•us ti,-«isaclir»u snail he construed t 1 u« 
t Money Meieipt aorl Offer to Purchase. 
«-« ^J^^pXi^fUsA1? (••' c ^ J-
<jr-v to c»rry out and lultill the t ' l n n a n d condition* specified above, and me seller agrees to turmsh good and marketable title with abstract brouqht to date or at Seller"* 
• r r "• r. t. '.r :; -
i' title insurance in the n.tmc •>! the purchaser and to make final corivevanc; bv warranly deed or , ' ; 
ialt of nth«-1 than teal pri-'oertv, sellrr wilt proviile evidence of title or nqht In sell or lease. If either 1 arty tails SO to do, he aqrees to pay all expenses of enforcing thi* aqree-
ii|ht .irismq out of the t>iea<h thereol, i.Kludioq a reasonable attorney's tee. ^' 
r anrers i" 1 • insider at inn of the r l toils ot the a«»nt 111 procuring a purchaser, to pay said auent .» • on 1'Mission of •
 # 
•1 nas eni.-r a m m a hstuiq iPnlract with any other aqent and said contract is presently eflective, t in . t.arariraoh will be of.rto force or ef^t t t . ' / 
— . •- _ +-\ - — — 
I DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
-Ji_0_ 
IM . ,'ioke.s to turmsh cotite* ot this «nntract bearing all signature* to buyer and seller. Dependent upon the method u**d, o n . of the following form* mu*l be completed.) 
RECEIPT 
i'»wl«d<ie receipt of a fina' copy of the foreqomq agreement bearing all *tqnatures: 
inaliv caused a final copy <•• the foreqoing aureement tiearinq all *iqnatur.* to be mailed to the QJ Seuer, ( J Purchaser on 
19 , by registered m*U and return receirt is attached hereto. 
0 . .:;•»....-. oate- ~^~* 
Adderdum F j 
Addendum fcr 
This is to certify that this is a true and £) p* 
accurate copy of the records on file with 
the City of Draper. 
CITY RECORDER 
TSarbaraSadler~ ?=**—i—*** 
BOLRD OF JLDJUSTKKHTS 
Th* April 12. 1979 Meeting 
Meeting called to order by Chairman Too Mellenthin with the following presents 
ftiane Sadler; Gary Kelson; Elmer Sterling; and Andrea Zimmerman, Sec. 
Meeting called to order at 8*21* p.*» 
Ho. 1s Appeal - Phil Edmunds 
Charge of $136" for not getting building permit from it City of Draper, 
Also $Qfc charge added to fee becauss he didn't get a building permit. 
Duane Sadler aored that the Sffi charge be made as originally issued 
with aeoond by Gery Kelson. Yoting was in favor. 
Question brought up aa to whether he need to get business license. 
Bo. 2s 1RTDB PBCK - Yarianoe 
Building is on a lit formerly less than one acre. Rimer Sterling moved 
to approval variance Seoond by Dnane Sadler, Motion earned. 
Ho. }i MQXJLL UfEgRSQH - Yarianoe 
Applying for U-plex variance. 
Ton Mellenthin moved to approve the variance on the duplex only. 
Seoond by Kliaer Sterling. Motion oarried. 
Ho. In ISMH1S BUBHHAK - Yarianoe 
Duane Sadler moved to approve said varlanoe with second by Gary Nelson. 
Motion carried. 
Ho. 5s LIKE CASTES - Yarianoe 
Lynn Carter was present to request 100 ft. frontage varianoe at bl(5 £• 
II48OO South. Duane Sadler moved to approve varianoe vlth seoond by Elmer Sterling. 
Motion oarriedt,^ 
Ho. 61 LAJQg MEMO*. SAM OVAED & PJLVID PIT - Yarianoe 
111 of above were present. 1 Mr. Stevens, neighbor, also present in 
favor. Ton Mellenthin moved to approve the varianoe baaed on the following 
a) 70 foot oul de sac; (b) 16 ft. paved eurfaoe back from main road; 
•^ (0) fire hydrant and adequate waterline. 
Second~by~Dagng Sadler" and motion passed unanimously. _# , 
OSJLLD JLLSHUSSSH - Yarianoe regarding the lot size from 1 acre to .>» acres. 
Slaer Sterling moved to approve varianoe with second DY Duane SaaJer, Met, t. 
carried unanimously. 
Meeting adjourned at $t}6 p.m. 
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2 IN C O N S I D E R A T I O N O F your agreement to use your af fort* to present this offar to the S«fMr. ! / - - » - • 7 / 1 ) CJ^ J** D, JS"*/Wl t iT \ 
hereby deposit with you a i earnest monay the »um of ($ . 
5 to secure and apply on tna purchase of trta property situated at s 
4 - - ^ / JZIZT ' partly ^Juirtoa) L. 
a a n a r n Nt a ; _ / r - r i ^ rr ( A~r .i jf{_ 
XO ~£>J? A J G / < . O t y l^i f / i l l \(\ C n - ? V / s i f * County. Stata of £ / > 4 » ^ t -
) i including any of trta following Ham* it at peasant attached to the premises: Ptumoing and heating fixtures and equipment Including stoker and oil tanks, water heaters, and burners, electric 
12 Hght fixtures excluding bulbs, bathroom fixtures, roller shades, curtain rods and fixtures, Venetian blinds, window and door screens, l inoleum, ail shrubs and trees, *nd any other fixtures 
« ""apt faQiOZ.* -. _ _ 
U The foi iowng personal property snail also be Includad as part of the property purchased: / 
i* uwixtL i x ~ 
17 Tha total purcnasa prica of »< ? ^ r
 ; rtOQ ) "7"CL"° \ ^ ^ '.V ^ t"'t' C ^ ' ^ " " " " » D O L L A R S 
1» shell be payable as foijows: $ / & Q which represants tna aforedetcribed daposit, racaipt of which is hereby acknowledged by you: 
\9 * - ~ & when veiier approves, sale: % C <_q T ^ O ^VO 7 * ° : o n delivery of deed or final contract of 
" j o tele which shall be on or before ^><?ri-f ^ A ^ 19 % - ~ > . -nn f , i — ——• - — • - — - — — — « - — — . ««-» "» mmojiga 
» if ?~6*ar& ajate. 77) Tfr j^rf ,1, &,//.—7>/4^,^., /ST, 198ST. ptoy*^ 
aa _7£ Ze. Stpct'fs/i FQ<? r^n/e f • / -• / 
13 )
 ; _ _ _ ^ 
ae 77? TSt/peJ? , y ~ ' 
%1 until the balance of $*_ fCPf CsC*Q together with interest Is paid: provided, however, that buyar at his option, at any t ima, may pay amounts in excass of tha monthly 
2 * p»vm»nn upon the unpaid balance, subject to tna limitations of any mortgagt or contract by the ttu%*r fterem assumed, interest at _ - < & r - * © « annum on « \ * unpaid portions o t o( the 
2 » purchase prica to be included In the prescribed payments and shall begin as ol date of possasslon which shall oa on or before * 5 ^ / ? ' / '<? c / 19 $< fc A » fJ»»< « ' <o« Mna destruction 
30 of property, and axpansas ol »"»«'•««;• »»*»•&• Oorn by tna saiiar until data ol possession at which time property taxes, rents, insurance. Interest and other expenses of the property shall be 
31 prorated as of date of possession. All other taxes and all assessments, mortgages, chattel liens and other nens, encumbrances or cnarges against the property of any nature shaTtoi paid by 
32 the seller excepti A.SQ <^ ^ - " 
3 3
 . - _
 T h #
 lowing specialjmprovemanis „ , mcluded in Ihr, sara. Sewer P7>Connecied ?T) Soptic Tenk and/or Cesspool £ ] > i d e w a l k P l ^ C u r b and Gutter jTHSpecla l Street Paving 
34 I D Special Street Lighting Q ^ C u h n a r y Water (City ^ O t h e r Community System ( ^ C o n n e c t e d g ) Private fxV> ( S a n d : Vas Jx) NO (o j . * - * * 
35
 Contract of S4l« or lnstrum«nt of conveyance tlFbd mad* on the approvetfform of the 5fan D«pt?0f Business Regulation In the nam* of 
3
« ^ f f / r f r D . ^ \.Hi*tC$] * «4 Pfrfrytc* Hi <'W / / / : , ?*•
 f t>. V CT >/ / 7 A *> 7Tr, :.V To . ~ . VS 
37 This payment is received and offar is made subject to the written acceptance of the seller endorsed hereon within / V p «~ &^>/*t>/.
 r * t d » t from date hereof, and unless so 
34 approved the return of the money herein receipted shall cancel this offer without damage to tne undersigned agent. * 
3» In the event the purchaser falls to pay the balance of said purchase price or complete said pure he te as herein provided, the amounts paid hereon shall, at the option of the seller. 
4 0 oe retained as liquidated and agreed damages. 
41 ' l» »« understood and agreed that the terms written In this receipt constitute the entire Preliminary Contract between the purchaser and the seller, and that no verbal statement made by 
4 2 ((anyone relative to this transaction shall be construed to be a part of this transaction unless incorporated in writing herein. It is further agreed tnat execution of the final contract shall 
4 3 Abrogate this Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase. / 
« ~7^tJ <+&*[£*. forrC'/r "V ~ - V'frtP *4<Se~* - = -
4 9 MM do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill the terms and conditions specified above, and the seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title with abstract brought to data or at Seller's 
4 6 option a policy ol title insurance in the name of the purchaser and to make final conveyance by warranty deed r\t
 u • — ~ — —— — * —*** — - •— s 
47 In the event of sale of other than real property, teller will provide evidence of title or right to sell or lease, if eitner party fails so to do, he agrees to pay ail expenses of enforcing fhte.agree-
ee ment, or ol any right arising out ol the breach thereof, including a reasonable attorney's fee. . ^ / O / 0 . * 
4 9 The seller agrees m consideraiion ol the elforts ol the agent in procuring a purchaser, to pay said agent a commission of ^/L £?/ ^stf'fC ' <t^ ( { if. . 
50 >n the event seller has entered into a listing contract with any other agent and said contract is presently etlective, this paragraph win oej l f noJrJrce 
7 c W J- Li*- x/i-V 
?)Uv£Uu / . (%r«*JL. 
Oil* , / / Sailer , 
2") &2(>t0QO /Uo^ J-& Beat fuJeire'A <^^ 15% pe,? />.U<U^UA . 
S3 (State law requires brokers to fumisn copies of this contract bearing ail signatures to buyer and seller. Oependent upon tne method used, one of the following lorms must be completed.) 
RECEIPT 
* 4 | acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing agreement bearing all signatures: 
Seller ' ' '"" o«ta Purchaser Date 
l personally caused a final copy of the foregoing agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed to tne Q Seller, Q Purchaser, on 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - — - _ _ _ _ _ _ - — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 l
* ________ . by registered mail and return receipt is attached hereto. 
I fKkk)0(Xxn\ J 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that four (4) copies of the foregoing 
Brief of the Appellants were mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following attorney this oO day of March, 1989. 
Thomas N. Crowther 
PARSONS & CROWTHER 
Attorney for Appellees 
455 South 300 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Frederick N. Green 
Julie V. Lund 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
